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NOTE

RESCUING YOUR ATTACKER: STATE OF
MONTANA EX REL. KUNTZ V. MONTANA
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Penny Lee Merreot

I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are in a tumultuous and abusive relationship.
You have finally gathered enough strength and resources to get
out. Right before you make your move, however, a violent
altercation ensues. Your almost-ex repeatedly slams your head
into the stove while he threatens to kill you. You are out of your
mind with fear and pain. In the midst of the assault, you catch
a glimpse of a knife nearby. Instinctively, you reach for it.
Because of your partner's rage and fixation on hurting you, he
fails to immediately realize what you are doing. Seconds later,
he is on the floor bleeding to death from a stab wound to the
chest.
You are in a state of shock and unable to comprehend or
accept what has happened. Your only thought is to get out and
distance yourself from the situation. You take his car keys and
start driving. After traveling several miles, you reach a friend's
house. You call your mom on the telephone and, in disbelief and
She arranges for
bewilderment, tell her what happened.
medical and law enforcement personnel to go to the residence
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where your former lover lies dying.
After you have some time to absorb what happened and talk
through it, you realize that what you did was justified. If you
hadn't noticed the knife at the moment you did, it would
probably be you lying on the floor bleeding to death. Since
leaving the house, you have been aware of this fact deep inside
yourself, and your family is now reassuring you of this.
However, you have a difficult time accepting that you had to kill
your partner in order to save yourself. Nevertheless, you tell the
officers who arrive what happened the best way you can,
including the fact that you used the knife because you were in
overwhelming fear for your own life.
Can an individual in this situation legitimately argue
justifiable use of force? Of course. However, the adoption of
State ex. rel. Kuntz v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court'
stands for the proposition that a person who justifiably uses
force to fend off an attacker may be found criminally culpable for
failing to summon aid for that attacker. 2 This note addresses
the issue of duty and its relationship to the justifiable use of
force defense in Montana. Part II of this note describes the facts
of Kuntz and the holding of the Montana Supreme Court. Part
III sets forth the history of the two relevant duties in the case:
the duty based on personal relationship and the duty based on
creation of the peril. Part IV analyzes the imposition of a legal
duty to aid one's attacker and examines the Montana Supreme
Court's reasoning behind the controversial decision. Part IV
also examines another recent case where the court imposed a
legal duty and which the Kuntz decision expanded upon.
Finally, the conclusion summarizes the court's analysis and
comments on the possible impact the decision may have on
future cases involving the affirmative defense of justifiable use
of force in Montana.

1. 2000 MT 22, 298 Mont. 146, 995 P.2d 951. This note will not address the
underlying and important issue of domestic violence that is present in the case.
2. Id. at 38.
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II. STATE OF MONTANA, EX REL. KUNTZ V. MONTANA
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

A. Summary of Facts
Bonnie Kuntz (Kuntz) and Warren Becker (Becker) were
involved in a tempestuous relationship and lived together for
approximately six years. 3 They were never married. 4 Verbal
and physical altercations transpired between them consistently
throughout their relationship. 5 Kuntz sought medical attention
at least twice for injuries caused by Becker. 6 There is also
7
evidence that Kuntz injured Becker during a squabble.
At the time of the events at issue, Kuntz and Becker were in
the process of ending their relationship.8 On the morning of
April 18, 1998, Kuntz and Becker had an argument, 9 but then
parted and did not see each other again that day until Kuntz
arrived home shortly before midnight. 10 Upon entering the
residence, Kuntz immediately noticed Becker had trashed it: the
phone was pulled from the wall and disabled," pictures had
been ripped off the wall, and a chair and mementos belonging to
Kuntz were placed in the wood burning stove.' 2 Kuntz began
preparing a pot of coffee prior to cleaning up the mess. 3
4
While Kuntz was making the coffee, Becker attacked her.
Becker's appearance and the power of the attack made Kuntz
fear for her life. 15 Becker shook her, grabbed her by the hair,
and slammed her into the stove.' 6 While Kuntz does not clearly
remember what happened next, she apparently grabbed a knife
nearby and stabbed Becker once in the chest.' 7
Kuntz
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Supplemental Brief of Relator at 2, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Supplemental Brief of Relator at 3, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Supplemental Brief of Relator at 3, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
Id.
Id.
Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 5, 298 Mont. 146, 5, 995 P.2d 951,
Supplemental Brief of Relator at 3, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
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18
remembers going outside through the back door to "cool off."
Becker walked through the living room and out to the front
porch. 19 A short time later, Kuntz entered the house and saw
blood on the floor that trailed out onto the front porch, where
Becker was lying face down. 20 Kuntz rolled him over, but he was
unresponsive. 21 Kuntz took Becker's car keys from his pocket
and drove to a friend's house several miles away where she
called her mother. 22
Kuntz's mother arranged for law
enforcement and medical personnel to be notified and advised
23
her to go back to the residence to wait for them, which she did.
On June 23, 1998, Kuntz was charged with negligently
causing the death of Warren Becker by stabbing him in the
chest. 24 Kuntz entered a plea of not guilty. 25 On November 6,
1998, the State amended the Information to charge Kuntz with
the same offense, but added the charge of criminal culpability
for failing to call for medical assistance. 26 Again, Kuntz entered
a plea of not guilty. 27 On December 18, 1998, Kuntz moved to
dismiss the Amended Information, or in the alternative, to
strike the allegation that her failure to seek medical assistance
28
constituted negligent homicide.
Kuntz asserted she would rely upon the affirmative defense
of justifiable use of force. 29 Because justified use of force is a

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 1 6, 298 Mont. 146, 6, 995 P.2d 951, 6.
22. Id. at 7.
23.
Supplemental Brief of Relator at 4, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
24. Application for Writ of Supervisory Control and Memorandum of Authorities in
Support at 1, Kuntz (99-055). A person commits the offense of negligent homicide if the
person negligently causes the death of another human being. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5104 (1999). A person acts negligently with respect to a result or to a circumstance
described by a statute defining an offense when the person consciously disregards a risk
that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists or when the person disregards a
risk of which the person should be aware that the result will occur or that the
circumstance exists. The risk must be of a nature and degree that to disregard it
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would
observe in the actor's situation. "Gross deviation" means a deviation that is considerably
greater than lack of ordinary care. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-104 (1999).
25. Application for Writ of Supervisory Control and Memorandum of Authorities in
Support at 1, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. A person is justified in the use of force or threat to use force against another
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to
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complete defense, Kuntz argued it would confuse the issues to
allow the jury to consider what happened after the stabbing in
terms of criminal negligence, as well as subject her to the
unconstitutional risk of conviction for behavior that is not
criminal. 30 By attempting to prove criminal negligence, the
prosecution would be able to appeal to the passions, sympathies,
and prejudices of the jurors by not only circumventing Kuntz's
justifiable use of force argument as a complete defense, but also,
by directing the jury's focus on Kuntz's failure to save Becker,
asserting Kuntz is criminally liable for her inaction. 31 The State
filed a brief in response, arguing that Becker's death was caused
by Kuntz's actions as a whole, that is, both the stabbing and the
failure to seek aid. 32 The State further argued that even if
Kuntz was justified in stabbing Becker, "the right to use force in
self-defense is extinguished when the threat is ended; a person
33
has no right to sit and watch the assailant die."
On January 8, 1999, the district court denied Kuntz's
motion to dismiss the Amended Information. 34 The district court
concluded that although justifiable use of force is a complete
defense, Kuntz had a duty to act as a reasonable person
following her use of the defense. 35 Kuntz then applied to the
Montana Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control. 36 On
March 23, 1999, the Montana Supreme Court accepted original
37
jurisdiction at the request of both parties.

defend himself or another against such other's imminent use of unlawful force.
However, he is justified in the use of force likely to cause death or serious bodily harm
only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or
serious bodily harm to himself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible
felony. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-102 (2000).

30. Application for Writ of Supervisory Control and Memorandum of Authorities in
Support at 1, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
31. Id. at 16.
32. Response to Application for Writ of Supervisory Control at 2, Kuntz (No. 99055).
33. Id.
34. Application For Writ of Supervisory Control and Memorandum of Authorities
in Support at 1-2, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
35. Order and Memorandum at 6, Kuntz (No. 98-531).
36. Application For Writ of Supervisory Control and Memorandum of Authorities
in Support at 2, Kuntz No. (99-055). A writ of supervisory control is issued only to
correct erroneous rulings made by the lower court within its jurisdiction, where there is
no appeal, or the remedy by appeal cannot afford adequate relief, and gross injustice is
threatened as the result of such rulings. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1605 (7t h ed. 1999).
37. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, I 11, 298 Mont. 146, 11, 995 P.2d 951, 11.
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B. Holding
The two primary holdings by the Montana Supreme Court
are: (1) One who justifiably uses deadly force nevertheless has a
38
legal duty to summon aid for the mortally wounded attacker;
and (2) One who justifiably uses deadly force and fails to
summon aid for her attacker may be criminally culpable for that
failure .39
The court stressed the duty to aid one's attacker is only
"revived" after the victim "has fully exercised her right to seek
and secure safety from personal harm."40 Kuntz argued such a
duty should not exist if justifiable use of force is established by
the jury because it is a complete defense. 4 1 As a complete
defense, Kuntz argued a finding of justifiable use of force would
entail the conclusion that she was warranted to act as she did
without peril. 42 However, the court agreed with the State that a
duty to aid an attacker should be imposed on a victim after the
43
victim has secured safety.
The court also ruled that a victim who fails to summon aid
for her attacker may be found criminally negligent "only where
the failure to summon aid is the cause-in-fact of death, rather
than the use of force itself (emphasis added)."44 The dissent
states this concept is unworkable and makes poor public policy,
for how can a victim be justified in taking an attacker's life at
one point in time, then later be held criminally liable for the
attacker's death for failing to aid him?4 5 It will undoubtedly be
interesting to see how this rule unfolds in future justifiable use
of force cases in Montana, especially when considering that past
case law sheds little light on the matter.
III. DISCUSSION OF PRIOR LAW
To find a person liable for a failure to act, there must be a
duty to act imposed by the law, and the person must be

38. Id. at T 33.
39. Id. at T 38.
40. Id. at 133.
41. Application For Writ of Supervisory Control and Memorandum of Authorities
in Support at 11, Kuntz (No. 99-055).
42. Id. at 14.
43. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 33, 298 Mont. 146, 33, 995 P.2d 951, T 33.
44. Id. at 1 38.
45. Id. at 50 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
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physically capable of performing the act. 46 The "American
bystander rule" imposes no legal duty on a person to rescue or
47
summon aid for another person who is at risk or in danger.
This is true regardless of moral obligations in society or "when
that aid can be rendered without danger or inconvenience to"
the potential rescuer. 48 However, there are exceptions to the
American bystander rule, two of which are primarily relevant to
the facts of Kuntz: (1) the duty based on a personal relationship;
and (2) the duty based on creation of the peril. 49 Criminal
liability may be imposed when one fails to take action and one of
these duties is present.5 0 This part of the note discusses past
case law regarding these two duties. It is important to point
out, however, that there is virtually no authority that addresses
whether or not a legal duty arises following an act of selfdefense. This issue is one of first impression in Montana.51
A. Duty Based on PersonalRelationship
Social policy may justify a duty to rescue when some type of
special relationship exists between individuals. 52 The foremost
authority on the personal relationship duty in Montana stems
from the case of State v. Mally. 53 In Mally, the Montana
Supreme Court held that a husband has a duty to summon
medical aid for his wife, and a failure to render such aid could
make the husband criminally liable if the "failure to act was the
proximate cause of the death."54 Kay Mally suffered from
several physical conditions, including hepatitis, cirrhosis,
osteoarthritis, and diseases of the liver and kidney. 55 One
evening, she fractured both bones in her upper arms. 56 Instead
of immediately providing medical attention for his wife, Mally
placed her in the bedroom for a few days.5 7 When Mally finally
46.
47.
48.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-202 (1999).
Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 14, 298 Mont. 146, 14, 995 P.2d 951, 14.
Id. [quoting Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054, 1064 (Md. 1979) quoting WAYNE R.

LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW, at 183 (1972)].

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 113.
57A AM. JUR. 2DNegligence § 99 (1989 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
139 Mont. 599, 366 P.2d 868 (1961).
Id. at 610, 366 P.2d at 874.
Id. at 600, 366 P.2d at 869.
Id.
Id.
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summoned an ambulance for Kay, medical personnel found her
unconscious and her head, face, and arms badly bruised and
swollen. 58 Kay Mally never regained consciousness and died a
few days later from degeneration of the kidneys, brought on by
59
the severe shock she suffered after fracturing both arms.
Mally's conviction of involuntary manslaughter was
compatible with the court's previous holding in Territory v.
Manton.60 In Manton, the court ruled a husband's drunkenness
was no excuse for his failure to summon medical aid on behalf of
his ill-clad wife, who perished outside in the cold. 61 Manton's
manslaughter conviction was also upheld by the Montana
Supreme Court because he, like Mally, let his wife languish
speechlessly while making no effort to summon medical
assistance .62
In the more recent case of State v. Decker,63 however, the
court concluded a husband was not liable for failing to summon
aid for his wife who was passed out on the floor of a bar after
being intoxicated and complaining of a headache the previous
night. 64 Decker's wife, Hyacinth, like Kay Mally, was generally
in poor health and suffered from high blood pressure and
cirrhosis of the liver. 65 In this instance, the court determined
the defendant husband did not depart "from the conduct of an
ordinary and prudent man" 66 by (1) putting his wife to bed after
she complained of a headache and fell; (2) putting her to bed a
second time after finding her in a bar passed out the next day;
and (3) finally, contacting a nurse and ambulance the following
67
morning because of concern for his wife's condition.
Significantly, the personal relationship duty does not only
apply to married persons as the above cases have illustrated. In
the 1910 case of State v. Rees, 68 which involved a couple who was
living together, but not married, the Montana Supreme Court
declared that, "even if the deceased was not defendant's wife, if
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Mally, 139 Mont. at 601, 366 P.2d at 869.
Id.
8 Mont. 95, 19 P. 387 (1888).
Id. at 109, 19 P. at 394.
Id.
157 Mont. 361, 485 P.2d 695 (1971).
Id. at 365, 485 P.2d at 697-698.
Id. at 363, 485 P.2d at 697.
Id.
Id.
40 Mont. 571, 107 P. 893 (1910).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/6

8

Merreot:
ex rel.V.
Kuntz
v. MontanaCOURT
Thirteenth Judicial District237
Court
DISTRICT
KUNTZ
2002 State of Montana

he was guilty of the assault, the legal duty rested upon him to
protect, care for, and shelter her after that act to the same
extent as though she had been his wife." 69 This rule is
applicable under the personal relationship exception to the
American bystander rule, as well as the next exception I will
address, the duty based on creation of the peril.
The notion that unmarried couples in a relationship may
still fall under the personal relationship exception was disputed
in People v. Beardsley.70 The Supreme Court of Michigan
determined the married defendant did not have a legal duty to
assist his "experienced" 71 mistress who had voluntarily ingested
morphine and later died. 72 The rule from Beardsley, however, is
now generally viewed as outdated,7 3 probably because of the
increasing number of unmarried couples involved in intimate
relationships. Accordingly, in Kuntz, the Montana Supreme
Court disregarded the rule from Beardsley and asserted that
Kuntz and Becker "owed each other the same personal
relationship duty as found between spouses under our holding in
Mally."7 4
B. Duty Based on Creation of the Peril
Courts have consistently held that a defendant who
positively acts to carelessly cause physical damage to the
plaintiff (or his property) is always held to owe a duty of care to
the plaintiff.75 In other words, when a person puts another in a
position of danger, he creates for himself a duty to rescue the
person from that danger.7 6 The Montana Supreme Court
recognized this duty to be more significant to the facts of Kuntz
77
than the duty derived from a personal relationship.
In United States v. Hatatley, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals found the defendant criminally liable for failing to
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 575, 107 P. at 894.
113 N.W. 1128 (Mich. 1907).
Id. at 1131.
Id. at 1129.
Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 18, 298 Mont. 146, I 18, 995 P.2d 951, 18.
Id. at 19.
Jane Stapleton, Duty of CareFactors:A Selection From the Judicial Menus, in

THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS IN CELEBRATION OF JANE STAPLETON 61, 72 (Peter

Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1998).
76. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.12 n.84 (2d. ed.
1986).
77. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 20, 298 Mont. 146, 20, 995 P.2d 951, 20.
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rescue the victim after beating him and leaving him injured and
shirtless in the freezing desert.78
Moreover, a recent
Washington court held a husband criminally liable for recklessly
causing the death of his wife by injecting her with a lethal dose
of cocaine, then failing to summon aid until 10-15 minutes after
she suffered a second seizure. 79 The court in the latter case held
the defendant "had a statutory duty to provide medical care, a
natural duty to provide medical help to his wife, and a duty to
80
summon aid for someone he helped place in danger."
While no pronouncement of the legal duty to summon or
render medical aid after using justifiable use of force has been
established in Montana or elsewhere in the United States, a few
jurisdictions have applied the duty based on creation of the peril
in cases where self-defense is an issue.81 For example, in People
v. Fowler,8 2 the defendant argued he struck decedent in selfdefense, then left him "lying helpless and unconscious in a
public road, exposed to that danger."8 3 The court stated "[tihis
conduct of the defendant would then be criminal or not,
according to the character of the blow he gave [the victim]. If it
was done in self-defense, it would be justifiable. If it was
felonious, it would be murder or manslaughter... ,84 While the

court did not expand any further on the defendant's duty or nonduty to rescue his victim from the public street following an act
of self-defense, from the court's statement, it appears that if the
defendant was justified in using deadly force against the victim,
he did not have a duty to rescue him from the busy street.
In King v. Commonwealth,85 the defendant was deemed
justified in shooting another individual, but the jury found him
guilty of voluntary manslaughter by unlawfully neglecting to
provide or refusing to permit others to provide medical attention
for the victim when the defendant should have known the
seriousness of the victim's wounds.8 6 However, the court
declared the particular jury instruction improper on which the

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

130 F. 3d 1399, 1406 (10th Cir. 1997).
State v. Morgan, 936 P.2d 20, 23 (Wash. 1997).
Id.
Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 22, 298 Mont. 146, I22, 995 P.2d 951,
174 P. 892 (Cal. 1918).
Id. at 896.
Id.
148 S.W.2d 1044 (Ky. 1941).
Id. at 1045.
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conviction was based.8 7 The instruction required the shooting be
"unlawful,"88 in order to find the defendant had hastened the
victim's death by "willful neglect or willful failure to provide
medical attention."8 9
Accordingly, the court reversed the
defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter and stated
that the condition precedent to defendant's guilt was not met as
required in the instruction because defendant did not unlawfully
shoot the victim. 90
Significantly, exceptions to the American bystander rule are
not absolute. 9 1 For example, a person is not required by law to
risk her own life to save another-whether she has a legal duty to
rescue another because of a personal relationship or whether she
placed another in a position of peril. 92 This point was made
decades ago in Yockel v. Gerstadt,93 where the Maryland Court
of Appeals stated, "[ulnder any and all circumstances, the law
places upon a man the duty of exercising reasonable care for his
own protection."94 The Montana Supreme Court supports this
rule of self-preservation, asserting that "the law does not require
that he or she risk serious bodily injury or death in order to
perform a legal duty,"95 even though such person may still be
96
held accountable for the peril bestowed on the other.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Legal Duty to Aid One's Attacker
The Montana Supreme Court limited its analysis of whether
a victim must aid her attacker following an act of self-defense to
circumstances when the exception of either a personal
relationship or creation of the peril exists. 97 The court relied on
Flippo v. State98 to declare that "whether inflicted in self-defense
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1045.
Id.
King, 148 S.W.2d at 1046-47.
Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 25, 298 Mont. 146,
Id. at
25-26.
140 A. 40 (Md. 1928).
Id. at 42.
Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 27, 298 Mont. 146,
Id.
Id. at 29.
523 S.W.2d 390 (Ark. 1975).

25, 995 P.2d 951,

25.

27, 995 P.2d 951, T 27.
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or accidentally, a wound that causes a loss of blood undoubtedly
places a person in some degree of peril, and therefore gives rise
to a legal duty to either: (1) personally provide assistance; or (2)
summon medical assistance (emphasis added). 99 However, upon
a thorough reading of Flippo, there is no mention whatsoever of
self-defense by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, nor does the
court enunciate or seemingly imply that such a duty would be
applicable following the use of self-defense. In Flippo, the court
merely found sufficient evidence existed to hold the defendants
criminally negligent after unintentionally shooting and killing a
man while hunting, then failing to render timely aid after
promising the victim's father they would do so. 100
The Montana Supreme Court made it clear that when a
person justifiably uses self-defense, she does not have to aid her
attacker if doing so would place her in harm's way. 10 1 This rule
logically flows from the basic theory underlying the notion of
self-defense, that is, the right to protect oneself. The court
compared the person that justifiably uses force to the American
bystander rule's innocent bystander. 10 2 Both the person that
justifiably uses force and the innocent bystander have no legal
03
duty to render aid; each simply has the duty to protect herself.
Somehow, from this scant analysis that some may argue
tends to call for the opposite conclusion, the Montana Supreme
Court determined that a duty to summon aid may be "revived"
as the State contends, but only after the victim has fully
exercised her right to seek and secure safety. 10 4 The court
stressed that imposition of this duty requires: (1) the victim is
physically capable of such action; and (2) the victim has
knowledge of the facts indicating a duty to act. 0 5 Accordingly,
the court ruled a legal duty may be "revived" after a victim uses
self-defense, but the two requirements of knowledge and
physical capability must be met first. 0 6 Moreover, when the
legal duty to aid is "revived," the victim may still not be liable
for negligent homicide, the charge at issue in Kuntz, because it

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 1 30, 298 Mont. 146,
Flippo, 523 S.W. 2d at 394.
Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 31, 298 Mont. 146,
Id. at 9132.
Id.
Id. at 9 33.
Id.
Id.
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requires a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care-a
standard that may not be met by failing to render aid-especially
under the circumstances generally present in a situation calling
10 7
for self-defense.
The Montana Supreme Court wrongly determined that a
victim may have a "revived" duty to aid her attacker following
her justifiable use of force against him. The dissenting opinion
is correct by stating "[tihis result is simply unworkable as a
practical matter and makes poor public policy."'0 8 How can
justified use of force against an attacker reconcile with a later
obligation to assist him? There is no rationale behind this duty.
It makes little sense to permit a victim to justifiably use deadly
force against another when in a life or death situation, then
place a legal duty on that victim to aid the other, who just
previously threatened the victim with serious bodily injury or
death.
Certainly, one could argue that a moral duty may arise
when and if the victim feels safe and is physically and
emotionally able to call for help if her attacker is in need.
However, a moral duty is not the same as a legal duty, as the
Restatement makes clear. 10 9 A moral duty generally cannot be
imposed on one individual to aid another, even if assistance
could easily be invoked. 110 Thus, it follows that such a duty
should not be placed on a victim to aid her attacker after the use
of self-defense.
Furthermore, the majority's stipulation that the duty to aid
shall be revived only after the victim is "safe""' is, at best,
vague. How does a person who is completely removed from such
a violent and extreme situation (such as a judge) decide when
the victim felt safe enough to elicit the duty to render aid to her
aggressor? It would be impossible, as far as I can tell, for
someone unrelated to the incident to later determine when (and
if) a victim felt safe from her attacker to, at some particular
point in time, give rise to a legal duty to rescue her attacker.
Justifiable use of force is authorized only in very limited

107. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 34, 298 Mont. 146, 22, 995 P.2d 951, 22.
108. Id. at 50 (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
110. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 14, 298 Mont. 146, 14, 995 P.2d 951 14 [quoting Pope
v. State, 396 A.2d 1054, 1064 (Md. 1979) quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW, at 183 (1972)].
111. Id. at T 33.
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circumstances. 11 2 It is applicable only when necessary to
prevent imminent death, serious bodily harm to oneself or
another, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. 113
However, in these limited instances, the use of deadly force is
acceptable. 1 4 "It is inherently contradictory to provide by
statute that under certain circumstances deadly force may be
justified, but that having so acted, a victim has a common law
duty to prevent the death of her assailant."1 5 Furthermore, it
should not be forgotten that justifiable use of force is a complete
16
defense, which must result in an acquittal if proven.
B. CriminalLiability for Failingto Aid One's Attacker
Since the Montana Supreme Court ruled a victim that has
justifiably used force may have a "revived" duty of care to her
attacker, it follows that the court held a failure to perform this
duty can give rise to criminal liability. 1 7 A victim under these
circumstances, however, may be criminally liable for failing to
render aid only if the failure was the "cause in fact" of the
aggressor's death, rather than the justified use of force." 8
Therefore, if the justified use of force directly led to the
aggressor's death, the victim cannot be criminally liable for
failing to render aid. To make the rule even more complicated,
the court notes that "a breach of the legal duty to summon aid
may be the cause-in-fact of death, but is still not necessarily a
crime" 119 under Montana's negligent homicide statute because a
gross deviation from an ordinary standard of care must be
shown. 20 Once again, the court has set forth a hazy rule that is
difficult to apply.
This rule is impractical for two reasons. First of all, it could
be extremely arduous to determine whether or not the failure to
summon aid was the cause-in-fact of the aggressor's death,
rather than merely the injuries received from the victim's
112.

Id. at J 51.

113.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-102 (1999).

114. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 51, 298 Mont. 146, 51, 995 P.2d 951, 51.
115. Id. (Trieweiler, J., dissenting).
116. Park v. Montana Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 1998 MT 164, 42, 289 Mont. 367,
42, 961 P.2d 1267, 42.
117. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 36, 298 Mont. 146, 36, 995 P.2d 951, 36.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 39.
120. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 24.
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justified use of force. In the cases where this information is not
easily ascertainable, one could convincingly argue either way.
For instance, one may assert the aggressor died simply as a
result of the force necessarily used by the victim, and he would
have died even if medical aid had been quickly administered.
On the other hand, one could argue the aggressor died as a
cause-in-fact of the victim's failure to summon medical aid soon
enough (after feeling safe, of course), rather than dying from the
injuries received from the victim through the use of self-defense.
The former argument has merit because "where a person is
placed in peril by another's justified use of force it can never be
said that the failure to summon aid, rather than the original act
of force, is the cause in fact of death, because presumably death
would never have occurred but for the original act of selfdefense." 121 The latter argument also appears worthwhile,
because is it not true that virtually anytime a person is seriously
injured, the lack of immediate medical attention directly
contributes to the quicker expiration of that person's life than if
such aid had been readily administered?
The second reason the court's rule that imposes criminal
liability is impractical results from its contradictory nature as it
relates to the affirmative defense of justifiable use of force.
When self-defense is proven, the victim is justified in taking the
attacker's life. How can the same victim be held criminally
liable for failing to render aid to the attacker later, and for the
injuries inflicted justifiably by the victim while defending
herself? Clearly, the court's rule in Kuntz and Montana's self122
defense statute are at odds.
The dissent was correct by asserting that a legal duty under
the circumstances in the present case should not be capable of
being revived, nor should the victim be held criminally liable for
failing to render aid to her attacker if such revival has taken
place.' 23 Kuntz is an unusual case in which imposing liability is
troublesome for public policy reasons. In cases such as this, it is
recommended that judges screen the plaintiffs claim under the
direction of duty. 24 To illustrate, the Restatement presents a
situation where there is an obvious problem in allowing suit
121. Id. at ]52.
122. Id. at 1 51; see also supra text accompanying note 29.
123. Kuntz, 2000 MT 22, 54, 298 Mont. 146, 54, 995 P.2d 951,
J., dissenting).
124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. a (2001).
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against a property owner who is clearly negligent, but a plaintiff
who is injured while deliberately trespassing on the owner's
property. 125 The difficulty with this lawsuit is similar to the
problem faced in Kuntz. In both cases, the defendant should
generally not be held liable for the plaintiffs harm because of
By
the plaintiffs role and the surrounding circumstances.
recognizing liability in such instances, courts take on a bold task
126
that is potentially problematic.
C. Another Recent Montana Supreme Court Decision and Future
Implications of Kuntz
The Montana Supreme Court is clearly expanding the
circumstances of when one person owes a legal duty to rescue
another. Prior to Kuntz, the court broadened the concept of a
legal duty in Nelson v. Driscoll.127 In Nelson, the court held a
police officer had a legal duty of care to a female driver following
a traffic stop. 28 The officer was aware the female and her male
passenger had been drinking alcohol, but the driver did not
appear intoxicated. 129 However, because the officer knew both
the driver and passenger consumed alcohol earlier that night, he
30
prohibited them from driving home and offered them a ride.
The couple did not accept the ride and stated they would call a
The officer then left the area, but
friend for help. 13'
subsequently drove by the couple several times to make sure
they did not attempt to get back into their vehicle.1 32 A short
while later, the female was killed after being struck by a car,
and the Montana Supreme Court held the police officer had a
duty to protect her from harm because he affirmatively took
33
steps to voluntarily provide a service to her.
While there is authority that a special relationship exists
between an officer and a prisoner in custody, 134 which imposes a
duty on the officer to protect the prisoner, this was not the
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
1999 MT 193, 295 Mont. 363, 983 P.2d 972.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Nelson, 1999 MT193, 38, 295 Mont. 363, T 38, 983 P.2d 972,
Id.
57A AM. JUR. 2DNegligence § 99 (1989 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
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situation in Nelson. In Nelson, the officer did not place the
female driver under arrest. The general rule is that a police
officer "has no duty to protect a particular individual absent a
special relationship."1 35 However, the court found the officer
assumed a duty to protect the driver merely because the officer
took affirmative and voluntary steps to prevent the couple from
driving home. 136 The court also concluded the officer's actions
constituted a foreseeable risk of harm to the female because of
icy conditions, darkness, and the fact the female had been
137
drinking alcohol.
The outcome of Nelson is off the mark. An officer that
simply takes away one's driving privileges because of alcohol use
should not then be burdened with a duty to protect that person.
In this case, the officer offered the couple a ride home and was
refused. The couple told him they would call a friend for a ride
home, and a pay phone was only a little more than a block
away. 138 The officer drove around in the vicinity where the
couple was located in order to check on them and make sure
they were not driving. 39 How would it be foreseeable to the
officer that the female would be struck by a car and killed? She
did not display enough characteristics to be charged with a DUI,
though she and the passenger admitted drinking. 140 Therefore,
regardless of the weather conditions, the officer did what he
could to assist the couple and should not be held responsible for
any harm to them. After all, the driver and passenger were both
adults who were accountable for their own actions.
In both Kuntz and Nelson, the court found a legal duty
where there should be none. Certainly, the court has expanded
the circumstances in which a legal duty exists. By finding that a
police officer owes a duty to rescue a possibly-impaired driver
and a victim owes a duty to rescue her attacker, it is hard to say
where the court will draw the line in the future. The court is
clearly leaning towards applying a legal duty wherever possible
instead of enforcing the American bystander rule, an arguably
more appropriate precept for cases concerning self-defense and
officer discretion.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Nelson,
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

1999 MT193,
38.
39.
11.

21, 295 Mont. 363,

21, 983 P.2d 972,

21.

8-9.
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V. CONCLUSION

The legal duty the Montana Supreme Court applied in
Kuntz is not supported by existing case law. For the most part,
this is because of the lack of any case law on point. However,
the court's decision does not logically flow from the few cases the
majority did cite in its analysis. The rule that after a person
justifiably uses force to fend off an attacker she must then
render aid to that attacker, is truly unfeasible. The revival of a
duty to rescue under such circumstances cannot legitimately be
imposed. If it is determined that an individual justifiably used
force to fend off an attacker, the inquiry should stop there. It is
simply incomprehensible to imagine a scenario unfolding as the
court suggests-that a person would defend herself by wounding
an attacker during a vicious struggle, regain composure and feel
safe, then personally aid her attacker or call for help in order to
save him. One can only hope the current trend by the Montana
Supreme Court of imposing a legal duty where there should be
none soon will be reexamined, and thus, short-lived.
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